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On 2 May 2018, the European Commission 
released its proposal for the next Multiannu-
al Financial Framework (MFF), covering the 
years 2021-27. In its own words, the Commis-
sion tabled ‘a new, modern long-term budget, 
tightly geared to the political priorities of the 
Union at 27’. This article analyses how much 
change and how much continuity the current 
proposal truly contains and discusses the 
next steps and possible negotiation dynam-
ics. We find that: 
•	 The proposal is larger than today’s 
MFF when comparing nominal and 
real volumes, but smaller in relation to 
EU27 Gross National Income (GNI).
•	 The planned shift of spending from tra-
ditional to new policies is bolder than in 
previous MFF proposals.
•	 During the negotiations, the tradition-
al coalitions of net recipients and net 
contributors might splinter in view of 
new cleavages concerning rebates and 
eligibility criteria for Cohesion funds.
1 ▪ What is on the table?
The Commission published a set of docu-
ments that describe its plans for EU spending 
and revenue after 2020. The part that received 
the most attention is a proposal for a new 
MFF regulation. The MFF aka the EU’s long-
term budget, allocates funds to different pol-
icy areas (‘headings’) and sets out maximum 
spending levels (‘ceilings’) for the EU. Since 
annual budgets are constrained by these ceil-
ings, the priorities set in the MFF decisively in-
fluence EU policy during a seven-year period. 
Therefore, the Commission proposal is keenly 
watched and commented on by EU member 
states and interest groups. However, the MFF 
regulation itself simply establishes the over-
all size and maximum spending levels per 
budget heading and some general provisions 
concerning the functioning of the EU budget 
(such as flexibility or reform procedures). 
Other aspects concerning the specific design 
and structure of EU spending programmes 
will be fixed in sector-specific legal acts and 
these will be proposed by the Commission in 
late May and June and negotiated separately. 
The Commission also proposed a new Own 
Resources Decision (ORD), which governs 
how the EU finances itself. We discuss it in 
section 5. While there is an obvious link be-
tween the spending and the revenue side of 
the EU budget, the ORD follows a different ap-
proval procedure. 
2 ▪ A complex political context
MFF negotiations are one of the most diffi-
cult political battles in the EU. They involve 
the European Parliament and the Council, but 
are de facto largely intergovernmental, with 
the final deal being adopted by the European 
Council by unanimity1. In theory, addressing 
common issues at the EU level is beneficial 
for all the 27. But in practice, negotiations 
between Member States follow the logic of a 
zero-sum game, pitting net recipients, which 
want to maintain or increase the amounts of 
EU spending they get, against net contribu-
tors, which favour limiting the budget’s overall 
size. 
Even if the economic context is better now 
than in 2011-13, when the current (2014-20) 
MFF was debated, the upcoming negotia-
tions promise to be particularly difficult. First, 
there is the Brexit gap, a financial shortfall of 
an estimated €84-98 billion over seven years 
caused by the UK’s departure. Views on how 
to adjust to this hole (cutting spending or in-
creasing revenues) alter traditional dynamics 
among net contributors and net recipients. 
On top of that, the EU is confronted by new 
spending needs in areas such as migration 
and border control, external security and dig-
ital transformation, which require between 
€91 and €390 billion of additional resources 
between 2021-2027 according to the Com-
mission2.
Furthermore, a tough calendar lies ahead. 
The Commission has published its proposal 
just one year before the European elections 
and it is lobbying for an agreement to be taken 
before the last plenary of the current Europe-
an Parliament (April 2019). As the past three 
MFF negotiations took more than 20 months 
to be finalized, this schedule looks very tight. 
And, for the moment, the European Council’s 
work programme (the ‘leaders’ agenda’) pre-
pared by President Tusk envisages negotia-
tions lasting until the end of 20193.
1. The European Parliament needs to give its consent to the Council’s position, meaning that it may approve or reject the Council’s deal 
but cannot insert amendments.
2. Bruegel’s calculus, based on European Commission’s Communication ‘A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a 
European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020 – The European Commission’s contribution to the Informal Leaders’ 
meeting on 23 February 2018’, COM(2018) 98 final.
3. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21594/leaders-agenda.pdf
3 ▪ Assessing the proposal: Size and re-
balacing
How does the Commission proposal com-
pare to the current MFF? Several factors com-
plicate the evaluation. First, the Commission 
describes some of its proposals in nominal 
terms (current prices) while others are ad-
justed for inflation (constant prices). Second, 
Brexit reduces the EU’s GNI by a sixth and 
therefore inflates the relative size of the MFF. 
Third, to properly compare the post-Brexit 
budget with the current one, we need to look 
at current EU spending in the remaining 27 
Member States and not at EU28 spending. 
Finally, the proposed 2021-27 framework 
includes the European Development Fund 
(EDF), which is worth around €5 billion per 
year and is excluded from the current MFF. 
Thus, it increases the proposed budget by 
0.03% of GNI. Ultimately, any assessment de-
pends on which perspective one chooses:
1. It is much bigger in current prices. 
The Commission proposes increasing 
spending on the EU27 by €217 billion 
(or 20.4%) to €1279 billion. 
2. It is slightly bigger in constant prices. 
In real terms (using the 2% fixed defla-
tor set out in the MFF regulation), the 
proposed MFF is worth €1135 billion 
in 2018 prices, or an increase of €54.3 
billion (5%) compared to EU27 spend-
ing in the period 2014-20 (including the 
EDF).
3. It is smaller in relative terms. At the 
moment, spending on the EU27 under 
the current MFF stands at about 1.13% 
of EU27 GNI. An additional 0.03% is 
spent on the EDF, bringing total spend-
ing to 1.16%. The Commission propos-
es an MFF worth 1.11% including the 
EDF, implying a reduction by 0.05 per-
centage points. 
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A comparison with the last two MFF nego-
tiations shows that the current proposal is 
in line with a long-running trend: the Com-
mission proposes a re-balancing of spending 
priorities, reducing the relative weight of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohe-
sion funds in the budget. However, the re-bal-
ancing planned this time is bolder than usual; 
there are significant changes in all areas (see 
table 1). The new priorities are clearly visible: 
In real terms, spending on internal and exter-
nal security more than doubles and funds ded-
icated to improving competitiveness increase 
by a third. Within this category, spending on 
research, innovation and digital amounts to 
€114.8 billion, an increase of 64% in nominal 
terms according to the Commission. 
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FIGURE 1 ▪ The Commission’s proposal for 2021-2027 compared to the current MFF
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission data.
TABLE 1 ▪ Re-balancing proposed by the Commission (last year of the proposed MFF compared to the last year of the preceding 
MFF, in real terms)




+ 194% +15% +34%
Cohesion spending +31% -5% -7%
Common Agricultural 
Policy +3% -12% -15%
of which direct 
payments / pillar 1 -3% -12% -11%
Security and interior +162% +9% +258%
Foreign policy +40% +15% +80%
Administration +31% +6% +10%
* with reform support programme included in cohesion spending
Sources for columns A and B: European Commission, EU public finances, 5th edition (tables 6.1 and 7.1). Source for column C: Authors’ calculations based on 
European Commission data.







at constant (2018) prices
MFF 2014-2020
(excluding transfers to UK and including EDF budget)
Commission MFF 2021-2027 proposal
1.16 1.11
% of GNI
It is remarkable that the Commission has 
proposed to decisively cut expenditure on the 
CAP. In nominal terms, the cut may appear 
small at only 5%, considering that the MFF 
has to cope with that significant Brexit gap. 
However, it entails serious reductions in real 
terms, as the cumulative impact of inflation 
erodes the value of the payments. By 2027, 
CAP spending would be 15% lower than in 
2020. Whether or not this is politically feasi-
ble is outside the scope of this paper, but one 
should note that the current MFF already en-
tails a cut in CAP spending in real terms4. It is 
also notable that direct subsidies to farmers 
(Pillar 1) are much less affected in the pro-
posal than funds for rural development (Pillar 
2). This has a distributional impact. Coun-
tries with a large share of Pillar 1 funding, 
like France and Poland, would be less affect-
ed than member states that extensively rely 
on Pillar 2, such as Portugal and Estonia.  At 
the same time, planned changes to the cal-
culation method for direct payments mean 
that eastern European farmers might receive 
more money per hectare in the future.  
Concerning Cohesion policy, the changes are 
especially complex to assess. Overall, Cohe-
sion spending will see an increase of 6% in 
nominal terms. In real terms, however, it fac-
es a 7% cut.  If one does not follow the Com-
mission in classifying the new reform support 
programme (which offers financial and tech-
nical assistance to member states reforming 
their economies) as Cohesion spending and 
only takes into account the three traditional 
funds (the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Co-
hesion Fund), spending in constant prices de-
creases by 9%. If one takes spending in 2026 
instead of 2027 as a point of comparison, the 
reduction even exceeds 12%. Independently 
of these considerations, the balance between 
funds shifts considerably. The Cohesion fund 
will clearly be substantially cut while the Euro-
pean Social Fund is increased. As in the CAP, 
the distribution of monies between member 
states can also be expected to change if, as 
the Commission implies, payments will be 
no longer based on GDP per capita alone but 
4. In the negotiations of the current MFF 2014 2020, the CAP budget was broadly maintained in nominal terms at the level of 2013 
spending. In consequence, CAP spending is expected to fall in real terms over the duration of the current MFF. 
also on indicators like unemployment rate 
and migration. This could mean less mon-
ey for eastern member states and more for 
Mediterranean countries.
4 ▪ Conceptual innovations in spending 
programmes
Apart from changes in MFF size and structure, 
the Commission’s communication announc-
es some interesting innovations in post-2020 
EU spending programmes and instruments.
For example, the proposal includes ideas for 
instruments that support the functioning of 
the European Monetary Union. These com-
prise a Stabilisation Function and a Reform 
Support Programme. The former is intended 
to help countries affected by large asymmet-
ric shocks and is open to all EU countries (not 
only euro area members). In terms of size, 
it is by no means a fully-fledged Eurozone 
budget in the spirit of French president Ma-
cron. It can provide up to €30 billion in back-
to-back loans and grants covering the costs 
of the interest, financed via member state 
contributions equivalent to the income they 
derive from the European Central Bank’s sei-
gniorage. The instrument would kick in before 
the ESM (European Stability Mechanism) and 
would be activated by a simple majority of 
the Council. The Reform Support Programme 
has a budget of €25 billion, the bulk of it (€22 
billion) serves to finance a ‘Reform Delivery 
Tool’ which offers member states financial in-
centives to implement key reforms identified 
as part of the European Semester. The pro-
gramme also includes a Convergence Facility 
worth €2.2 billion, providing dedicated finan-
cial and technical support to member states 
wishing to join the euro.
There is also a radical reshaping of EU fi-
nancial instruments and guarantees. The 
European Fund for Strategic Investment 
(EFSI) created by the Juncker Plan and all 
existing centrally-managed financial instru-
ments are replaced by a single, multi-policy 
guarantee instrument at EU level (‘Invest EU 
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Fund¨). An important novelty is that this new 
EU guarantee will be provided to different 
implementing partners (such as national pro-
motional banks, or the ERDB) and not only to 
the European Investment Bank group as is 
the case for EFSI.
Finally, the Commission proposes to intro-
duce a mechanism linking the respect of the 
‘rule of law’ to the disbursement of EU funds. 
Rather than sanctioning breaches of funda-
mental EU values according to Art. 7 TFEU, 
the Commission targets generalised deficien-
cies in the rule of law that threaten the EU’s 
financial interests. For example, a country 
might be unable to manage EU funds or to 
combat fraud and corruption because it lacks 
an independent judiciary system. Under this 
proposal, the mechanism would be activated 
by the Commission, which decides whether 
the conditions are fulfilled and what kind of 
sanctions should be imposed. The proposal 
is adopted unless the Council rejects it by 
qualified majority (‘reversed qualified majori-
ty’).  The final beneficiaries of EU funds are 
not expected to be affected by sanctions be-
cause member states are obliged to continue 
implementing the affected programmes.
N.B.: all these changes are not part of the 
draft MFF regulation. They will be detailed 
in sector-specific legislative acts, whose ap-
proval is submitted to qualified majority in the 
Council.  However, as in the past MFF nego-
tiations, some of these elements may be in-
cluded in the European Council’s MFF conclu-
sions, thus de facto pre-empting major policy 
changes in EU sectoral regulations.
5 ▪ Own resources and the question of 
rebates
Financing an overall larger budget and more 
priorities, the ORD requires special attention. 
In spite of possible financial shortfalls, the 
Commission regards Brexit as a political op-
portunity that should be grasped to push for 
comprehensive reforms of the EU’s revenue 
system. This is due to the end of the UK re-
bate, a reduction of an estimated 66% that 
country’s overall contribution. Its removal will 
automatically imply the end of the ‘rebates 
on the rebate’, originally granted to Germany, 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, net contrib-
utors, who thereby pay only 25% of their nor-
mal share of the UK’s rebate. Their removal 
will translate into a sudden increase of these 
four countries’ contributions. The Commis-
sion’s intention is to eliminate these rebates 
and other corrections granted to these four 
countries plus Denmark (such as reduced call 
rates on the VAT Own Resource and lump-
sum reductions to GNI-based contributions), 
but to phase them out over a period of five 
years so as to give them time to adjust. How-
ever, some of the countries in question have 
already expressed their opposition to Com-
mission’s plan to end rebates. 
Simultaneously, the Commission proposes a 
‘basket’ of new Own Resources that does not 
do justice to measures elaborated previously, 
e.g. in the so-called Monti report (2017). Be-
sides revenues from the Emissions Trading 
system and simplified VAT-based contribu-
tions, the Commission proposes a 3% rate ap-
plied to the (not yet implemented) Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
and a levy of €0.80 per kilo on non-recycled 
plastic packaging waste. The former is calcu-
lated to yield €12 billion per year – once the 
CCCTB is adopted. Given that negotiations 
have been going on more or less unsuc-
cessfully for years, this source of financing 
is anything but certain. The latter will make 
up to €7 billion (at €0.80/kg). According to 
the Commission, it is a ‘not a tax-based own 
resource’. In fact, it would be like an extra levy 
and will certainly reignite the debate on the be-
haviour-changing effect of flat-rate taxes and 
the social impact on poorer consumers. Resis-
tance is already growing, e.g. in Germany.   
The ORD is subject to an approval proce-
dure different to that of the MFF regulation. 
It requires unanimity in the Council but must 
also be ratified by all Member States’ national 
parliaments, while the European Parliament 
has no say. Furthermore, unlike the MFF reg-
ulation, the ORD does not expire after seven 
years and continues to be valid until a new 
Decision enters into force. Therefore, the EU’s 
revenue system has a stronger status quo 
bias than EU spending.
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6 ▪ What to expect from negotiations
The presentation of the Commission’s MFF pro-
posal marks the start of a long negotiating pe-
riod involving both European Council and Par-
liament.  As noted above, external factors may 
change the dynamics between net contributors 
and net recipients, and complicate negotiations. 
On past experience, a classic ‘negotiating ef-
fect’ is a significant cut in the overall size of 
the MFF from the Commission’s proposal to 
the final deal. Figure 2 illustrates the differ-
ence between the Commission proposal and 
the MFF adopted by the European Council in 
previous negotiations. If we assume a similar 
dynamic this time, the result would be a mea-
gre 1.01% of EU27 GNI (or 0.98% without the 
European Development Fund). 
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MFF 2007-13 MFF 2014-20 MFF 2021-27
Commission's initial proposal European Council agreement
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on European Commission data.
Another typical negotiation effect is the dif-
ference in cuts between pre-allocated and 
non-pre-allocated spending. Since net recip-
ients tend to protect pre-allocated spending 
(which accounts for most), and net contrib-
utors ask for reductions in the budget’s over-
all size, the areas more exposed to cuts are 
those where the distribution is not pre-or-
dained but rather determined by the Commis-
sion according to need and merit in a specific 
situation (see table 2).
TABLE 2 ▪ Difference in spending by heading between Commission proposal and European Council decision
2007-2013 2014-2020
Mostly pre-allocated spending
Cohesion spending -8% -4%
Common Agricultural Policy -7% -4%
Mostly not pre-allocated spending
Competitiveness -39% -24%
Security and internal policies -27% -17%
Foreign policy -19% -16%
Administration -14% -2%
Source: Authors’ representation based on European Commission,. EU public finance, 5th edition. Tables 6.2 and 7.2.
Given that member state rhetoric is as fo-
cused on net returns as ever, we can expect 
the same dynamic to work this time, too. 
On top of that, the fronts between net con-
tributors and net recipients may become 
entrenched due to the proposed cuts in co-
hesion policy and CAP. Nevertheless, new 
dynamics among member states need to be 
considered, namely an erosion of the ‘classic’ 
net recipients and net contributors fronts:
•	 there may be changes within the net re-
cipients’ coalition. New issues such as 
the rule of law conditionality or the fact 
of complementing the GDP with other 
eligibility criteria for the distribution of 
cohesion spending (particularly unem-
ployment levels and migration) can 
create new splits among them.
•	 there may be changes within the net 
contributors’ coalition. Net contribu-
tors like the Netherlands or Austria are 
unwilling to increase their contribution. 
=Others like France and Germany have 
announced their willingness to pay 
higher contributions. The debate on 
the removal of the ‘rebates of the re-
bate’ may create new divisions among 
net contributors. 
What’s more, the UK’s departure may change 
the dynamics of negotiations in the Council. 
During the last MFF negotiations, the UK gov-
ernment played a crucial role, forcing a sig-
nificant last-minute reduction in the overall 
ceiling for payments. It is true that Austria, 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
so far taken a strong stance against any in-
crease, but without a big country such as the 
UK in their group they may be unable to keep 
their demand alive until the bitter end.  
Finally, what can we expect from the Euro-
pean Parliament? Having only the right to 
accept or reject the Council’s agreement en 
bloc, the Parliament usually plays a second-
ary role in MFF negotiations. In the last ne-
gotiation, which took place in a context of 
national fiscal consolidation, MEPs did not 
even challenge the overall figures agreed by 
the Council and merely asked for targeted 
improvements (e.g. reinforcement of flexibil-
ity provisions, an overall commitment to use 
maximum flexibility, the introduction of a re-
vision clause and the creation of a high level 
experts group on own resources among oth-
ers). This time, the economic context is more 
favourable, but the political calendar is an is-
sue. If the current Parliament wants to have 
a voice in the design of the next MFF, it has 
to vote on it before the European elections in 
May 2019, giving it little time to negotiate with 
the European Council. 
Conclusion
The post-Brexit MFF proposed by the Com-
mission can be seen as a post-crisis budget. 
Despite the financing gap left by Brexit, spend-
ing is planned to increase in both nominal 
and real terms. Comparatively high project-
ed growth and inflation rates overall ensure 
that the proposal is – at 1.11% of EU27 GNI 
– still proportionally smaller than the current 
framework. At the same time, general govern-
ment spending in the member states keeps 
increasing, from 44.6% of EU GDP in 2007 to 
45.8% in 2017. In other words, the volume of 
the 2018 MFF proposal is around €120 billion 
bigger than that put forward seven years ago, 
while spending in the member states has in-
creased by €800 billion over the same period. 
The rebalancing proposed by the Commis-
sion is relatively ambitious but by no means 
radical. The economic environment facilitates 
a rebalancing without much pain despite 
Brexit: Priority areas like innovation, migration 
and defence receive significantly more fund-
ing even though cuts to the CAP are moder-
ate and Cohesion spending slightly increases. 
During the negotiating phase, it is likely that 
the conflict between net recipients and net 
contributors will matter greatly, but new cleav-
ages are visible even today. Fights over the re-
tention of rebates or the criteria for cohesion 
funding might break up traditional coalitions. 
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